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Is there something rotten in Denmark? 
Earnings management to avoid small losses. 
 
Abstract: 
This study focuses on earnings management by investigating the frequency distribution of the reported 
earnings in a European country. In particular, the relation between main “manageable” elements of 
working capital and reported earnings is examined. The modified and extended Jones model is used to 
identify and separate discretionary accruals in order to identify pre-managed earnings. By comparing the 
frequency distribution of these calculated pre-managed earnings and the reported earnings, it is shown 
that the combination of the research of earnings management based on studies of irregularities in the 
earnings frequency distribution and studies of discretionary accruals can be a powerful approach to 
examining the existence of earnings management.  
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Is there something rotten in Denmark? 
Earnings management to avoid small losses. 
1.  Introduction. 
Earnings management has been defined in several different ways, but the definition made by Schipper 
(1989, p. 92) remains very central: “… a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting 
process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain (as opposed to merely facilitating the neutral 
operation of the process)”. But how do we operationalize this, since it center on managerial intent, 
which by nature is unobservable? 
 
Management prepares the financial statements, including company’s net earnings, which can always be 
separated into a cash flow from operations part and an accruals part. While the cash flow is perceived as 
a fact, the accruals part is reflecting a natural development in the company’s working capital due to the 
company’s basic economic conditions, as well as some discretionary management behavior regarding 
valuation and estimation.
 
In this context, the level of earnings management can be defined as the relation between the accruals and 
the cash flow, suggesting that managerial intent affects the occurrence and magnitude of the accruals 
which requires assumptions and uncertain estimates of future cash flows. Ideally, this should be no 
problem, but numerous empirical studies suggest that many firms manage their earnings over time. 
These studies generally fall into two categories: 
 
•  Frequency studies, where the statistical distribution of the presented financial data is investigated. It 
has been found that relatively few firms report small losses while relatively many firms report small 
positive earnings. This is usually seen as an indication of earnings management
1, and in order to 
support the hypothesis, the actual levels of current assets and liabilities can be investigated, since 
these two accounting components (and their respective sub-specifications) can be perceived as 
proxies for how easy earnings management can be made. 
 
•  Incitements based studies, where the starting point is a given situation, in which management could 
be expected to have some interest in managing the reported data in order to obtain some (private) 
gain
2. Afterwards this is controlled by comparing a group of firms under suspicion of practicing 
earnings management with a group of firms not under suspicion, using an accrual accounting model. 
As a mean to separate the groups, a number of models of so-called discretionary accruals are used to 
 
1 See for instance Hayn (1995), Burgstahler & Dichev (1997) and Burgstahler & Eames (2003). 
2 See for instance Holland & Jackson (2004)   4
                                                
identify the potential manipulation of accruals to achieve the earnings management goals by using 
the accruals aggressively to shift or adjust the recognition of cash flows intentionally over time. In a 
comparative accruals-models study, Thomas & Zhang (2000) found that in general all other models 
than the Jones (1991) model have not been as popular as a method of separating the accruals part of 
the net earnings number during the last many years even though some problems are associated with 
the model
3. For this reason, and despite the criticism, only the extended Jones model (here the 
company specific time series version) will be considered in this study.  
 
While the Jones-model technique was originally developed to separate between managed and un-
managed financial statements, it can also be used to roll the discretionary accruals backwards, i.e. the 
managerial influence, whereby some pre-managed earnings can be obtained. By doing so, we have the 
opportunity to focus on differences between the reported earnings and the pre-managed earnings in the 
frequency distribution pattern around zero. In particular, and contrary to the reported earnings, we 
expect no irregularities around zero for the pre-managed earnings. 
 
Already Burgstahler & Dichev (1997) studied the relationship between the irregularity around zero and 
the size of the current assets and liabilities, and they found this irregularity were much more thorough 
for firms having relatively larger working capital accruals levels.   
 
This reasoning forms the basis for the following testable hypothesis: 
H1:  The existence of an irregularity in the earnings frequency distribution around zero is increasing in 
the magnitude of the different specific working capital accounts, and vice versa. 
 
Also Beneish (1999) was dealing with the problem of how to detect if the reported earnings were in fact 
manipulated. In a setting where he compared 74 manipulating companies with 2,332 non-manipulators, 
he found several variables having significant differences between the two groups, i.e. the two groups 
were characterized by different levels of identified financial ratios, for example a sales growth index 
expressing the one-year-ahead development in the sales figure. Indeed, he argues that based on the 
found relations it would be possible to identify and separate manipulating companies simply by 
screening the financial statements and bench marking with the findings. 
 
This argumentation and reasoning forms the basis for our second testable hypothesis: 
H2:  The existence of an irregularity in the earnings frequency distribution around zero is increasing in 
the magnitude of the different SEC-violators items, and vice versa. 
 
 
3 See Peasnell et al (2000)   5
Some studies have dealt more profound with the very nature of the actual mapping of the reported 
earnings into cash flow through working capital accounts like the accounts receivable, inventory and so 
forth, focusing on the uncertainty regarding the different factual estimates. Common for many of these 
studies, like Dechow (1998), is the conclusion that the longer the operating cycle, the more uncertainty 
is involved and as a consequence the more likely is also the presence of earnings management through 
discretionary accruals behavior concerning the different working capital estimates. 
 
Based on this intuition our third testable hypothesis is formed as follows:  
H3:  The existence of an irregularity in the earnings frequency distribution around zero is increasing in 
the magnitude of the operating cycle, and vice versa. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents, defines and describes the 
approaches to earnings management used in the paper. Section 3 describes the sample selection and 
descriptive statistics. Empirical results are provided in Section 4 - the first part concerns observation of 
earnings management to avoid small losses in a general setting, while the last part concerns how the 
reported earnings are managed through discretionary behaviour, in a more specific setting. Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
 
 
2.  Approaches to earnings management and calculation of metrics. 
The approach in Burgstahler & Dichev (1997) is used when assessing the earnings frequency 
distribution and discussing earnings management by reference to discontinuities in the distribution of 
earnings outcomes around zero. The approach relies on existing associations between accruals and some 
accounting fundamentals, which makes it possible to separate the accruals into normal and abnormal 
components. The earnings measure of interest is calculated as the net earnings scaled by lagged total 
assets. 
 
The different accruals-related measures are calculated by use of information from the balance sheet and 
income statement, rather than from the statement of cash flows, as it ensures a complete and stringent 
dataset since the older cash flow statement data are incomplete. The definitions follow those of Dechow 
et al (2003): 
 
(1) TACt = (∆CAt - ∆CLt - ∆Casht + ∆STDEBTt - Deprt) 
(2) Earnt = CFOt + TACt
 
where    TACt  = change in total accruals in year t,   6
                                                
∆CAt    = change in current assets between year t-1 and year t, (which can be 
   separated into inventory, accounts receivable and other current assets) 
∆CLt    = change in current liabilities between year t-1 and year t, 
∆Casht   = change in cash between year t-1 and year t, 
∆STDEBTt   = change in debt in current liabilities between year t-1 and year t, 
Deprt   = depreciation in year t, 
Earnt    = net earnings in year t,  
CFOt    = cash flow from operations in year t, 
 
In this setting, although TAC might be a quite small net number, the components in the relation above 
might be large gross numbers. For this reason it is interesting to go into details with the specific, 
manageable TAC-components, like change in inventory size, by looking at the levels of these working 
capital components. In other words: How much does it take to deliberately affect the change in TAC? 
Applying the modified and extended Jones approach to the earnings management setting, earnings 
management is related to the extent to which accruals are not well explained by earnings adjusted for 
receivables and property, plant and equipment, whether this misspecification is due to discretionary or 
non-discretionary behaviour
4. To estimate not-expected or abnormal accruals using the modified and 




(3) TACt = α + β1((1+k)∆Salest-∆AR) + β2PPEt + β3LagTAt + εt
 
where    TAt-1   = total assets at the beginning of year t,  
∆Salest   = change in sales between year t-1 and year t, 
PPEt   = gross value of property, plant and equipment in year t. 
In equation 3, the parameter k expresses how the change in sales is mapped into a change in accounts 
receivable (∆AR), and it is estimated at 0.5886 by use of the following regression: 
 
(4)  ∆ARt = α + k∆Salest
 
The specific parameter estimates obtained from the equation above are used to separate the accruals into 
a firm-specific normal non-discretionary accruals part, NDAt, while the remaining is calculated as the 
abnormal discretionary accruals in year t, DAt = TACt - NDAt   
 
 
4 See Dechow et al (2003). 
5 Consistent with prior literature and throughout this paper, all variables are scaled by lagged total assets.   7
These abnormal discretionary accruals are generally accepted as the influence, management has had on 
preparing the financial statements, since they represent the part of the total accruals which cannot be 
explained by the natural development in certain key accounting items. Whether management has 
managed the discretionary accruals (and thereby also the earnings) due to what ever might be the reason 
cannot be concluded. Likewise, it is difficult to conclude whether the discretionary accruals thereby 
reflect real changes in the firm’s underlying economic conditions. Based on this intuition and correcting 
the net earnings figures with discretionary accruals, one will obtain what could be called pre-managed 
earnings – that is the net earnings as they would have been, if management made no discretion. These 
pre-managed earnings (PME) are defined as net earnings (Earn) minus discretionary accruals (DA): 
 
(5) PMEt = Earnt - DAt  
 
Hereafter, the assumption is that since the Jones model captures management discretion, it is expected 
that the frequency distribution of the pre-managed earnings is bell-shaped and smooth like the reported 
earnings frequency distribution, but without any irregularities around zero. 
 
 
3.  Sample selection and descriptive statistics. 
The accounting data are mainly retrieved from the database “Account Data”, owned by the Copenhagen 
Business School, and supplemented by some official financial statements published by the individual 
firms. Adjustments to the figures in this database are made in order to improve the comparability, where 
the Danish authorities allow different accounting practices. The sample consists of all non-financial 
Danish firms listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange during the period from 1983 to 2002, available 
in the “Account Data” database. The sample is restricted to firms with complete data for earnings, assets 
and other relevant balance sheet items for at least 8 years in a row, which provides us with time series 
data from up to 20 years’ financial statements, one can question whether the data are really comparable 
over time. Denmark as member of the European Union is obliged to implement the different EU-
resolutions passed in relevant national legislation, and of high importance the 4
th EU-directive was 
implemented in DK in 1981. This leaves us a time period long enough to cover a complete business 
cycle, where the legislative conditions are by and large uniform. 
 
All this yields a sample of 2,187 firm-years, divided by 149 firms. 
 
*** Insert Table 1 *** 
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Descriptive statistics are provided in Panel A in Table 1. Here, as in the rest of the paper, all variables 
are scaled by lagged total assets in order to ensure that the data are at the same level, and in order to 
make it relatively easy to compare findings with other similar studies. When comparing the variation in 
the scaled earnings and the variation in the pre-managed earnings, the similar statistics are higher for the 
pre-managed earnings than the reported earnings. Despite this, an examination of Table 1 reveals that 
the descriptive statistics are generally in line with those of other studies using similar variables and time 
periods, e.g. Hayn (1995) and Burgstahler & Dichev (1997). 
 
The earnings and pre-managed earnings have mean and standard deviation of 0.0378 / 0.2079 and 
0.0723 / 0.4164 respectively, confirming that the reported earnings are more centred on the mean than 
the pre-managed earnings. Since the number of positive observations is 83% and 75% respectively, it 
also indicates that a quite large part shifts from a negative to positive number. The difference between 
the total accruals and the non-discretionary accruals determined using time series OLS-regression on 
each firm is a proxy for the discretionary accruals are on average negative, mean –0.0345. Analogously, 
the mean pre-managed earnings, 0.0723, exceed the mean reported earnings, 0.0345. Interesting is that 
the reported earnings observations have a clear tendency to be less skewed and much more centered 
around the median, 0.0425, than the pre-managed earnings observations, median 0.0548. To conclude, 
the implications are that one of the observable effects of discretion is a clear reduction of the earnings 
variation, which leads to more homogeneous reported earnings and enlarging the number of positive 
observations.   
 
Panel B in Table 1 provides pair wise correlation coefficients between some key variables in the setting. 
Especially worth noting is the significantly high correlation between pre-managed earnings and 
earnings, 0.6777, compared to the correlation between cash flow from operations and earnings, 0.4520 
Also the negative correlation coefficient between cash flow from operations and non-discretionary 
accruals, -0.9170, respectively pre-managed earnings and discretionary accruals, -0.8744, are 
interesting, since they indicate that the larger the cash flow from operations the less attributable are the 
non-discretionary accruals, respectively negatively relation between the magnitude of the pre-managed 
earnings and the discretionary accruals. Both pair wise relations are in line with above observations 
regarding the variations of the earnings compared to the pre-managed earnings. 
 
 
4.  Results of testing the earnings distribution. 
4.1  Existence of earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses. 
Graphical evidence in the form of histograms of the pooled cross-sectional empirical distributions of the 
scaled earnings is presented here. Earnings management to avoid small losses is likely to be reflected in   9
                                                
cross-sectional distributions of earnings in the form of unusually low frequencies of small losses and 
unusually high frequencies of small positive earnings. 
 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of earnings scaled by the lagged total assets, Earningst / TotalAssetst-1. 
Positive values of earnings consist of the firms’ reporting positive earnings. If managers are trying to 
avoid small losses, we expect to observe unusually few observations immediately to the left of zero, and 
an unusually large number of observations immediately to the right of zero. 
 
*** Insert Figure 1 *** 
 
Figure 1 is a histogram of the scaled earnings with histogram interval widths of 0.01 for the range –1.00 
to +1.00. The figure shows a single-peaked, bell-shaped distribution with an irregularity near zero. The 
result is quite similar to the original Burgstahler & Dichev (1997) study. The irregularity means that 
earnings slightly less than zero occur less frequently than would be expected given the smoothness of 
the remainder of the distribution, and earnings slightly higher than zero occur more frequently than 
would be expected. This empirical distribution with an irregularity near zero is consistent with earnings 
management to avoid small losses. The significance of this irregularity near zero is confirmed by a 
statistical test, namely the standardized differences test based on Burgstahler & Dichev (1997) to test the 
significance of the irregularity. The standardized differences is the difference between the actual number 
of observations in an interval and the expected number of observations in the interval (operationally 
defined as the average of the number in the two adjacent intervals) divided by the estimated standard 
deviation of the difference
6. This test relies on the assumptions that the distribution of scaled earnings is 
relatively smooth. For smooth earnings distribution not affected by earnings management, the 
distribution of standardized differences should be approximately normal with mean 0 and standard 
deviation 1. Therefore, the critical value of a one-tailed test of significance at level 0.05 is 1.645 
 
The standardized differences corresponding to the intervals immediately adjacent to zero provide two 
alternative tests for earnings management, but the relative power of the two alternative tests will depend 
on what pattern describes the effect of earnings management on the empirical distribution of earnings. In 
this study, the result below focus on standardized differences for the interval left of zero as the primary 
test of statistical significance. 
 
 
6 Tests based on the standardized differences usually assume the number of observations in an interval is a random variable, 
which is independent of the number of observation in adjacent intervals. Thus, the variance of this difference is 
approximately the sum of the variances of the components of the difference. Denoting the probability that an observation will 
fall into interval i by pi, the variance of the differences between the observed and expected number of observation for interval 
i is approximately npi(1-pi) +  ¼n(pi-1+pi+1)(1-pi-1-pi+1).   10
                                                
The standardized differences for Figure 1 are summarized in Table 2. The two left side columns report 
the values of test intervals: standardized difference for the interval immediately left of zero and 
standardized difference for the interval immediately right of zero. Values for standardized differences 
for the remaining intervals in Table 2 include standardized differences for all the remaining intervals 
shown in each of the figures
7. 
 
*** Insert Table 2 *** 
 
The standardized difference for the interval immediately to the left of zero is –2.3069, which is 
statistically significant at a 1% level, while it is 0.8459 for the interval immediately to the right of zero, 
suggesting the sign is as expected, but insignificant. These results suggest that there are less 
observations than expected under the smoothness assumption in the interval immediately left of zero and 
vice versa to the right of zero. In addition, these standardized differences are quite large in absolute 
magnitude compared to the standardized differences for the remaining intervals in Figure 1. Indeed, 
comparing the calculated standardized differences with the critical value (at a 5% level) we do not 
observe any other significant standardized difference in any interval. Comparing these observation 
statistics with the standardized differences for the pre-managed earnings we can observe that the sign to 
the left and right are the same, but both statistics have lost their significance. Thus, the statistical tests 
confirm that concerning the reported earnings there is an empirical irregularity near zero which is 
consistent with the hypothesis of managerial actions to avoid small losses. 
 
Summarizing the combined evidence suggest that the distribution of earnings scaled by lagged total 
assets in general show some abnormal patterns around zero, telling that earnings management is also 
taking place in DK. The use of the Jones model to roll the discretionary accruals back supports the 
conclusion, since these pre-managed earnings do not show the same abnormal pattern. But although 
there are supporting evidence, of using earnings management to avoid small losses, the results do not 
provide us with any answer as to how and why the earnings seems to be managed.  
 
 
4.2  Evidence on the methods of earnings management to avoid small losses. 
Since the above evidence of earnings management provided in the previous section is not completely 
unequivocal, some additional evidence will be provided here. It is often stated that what earnings 
management basically is all about when looking at the financial statements, is manipulation of working 
 
7 The standardized differences for most extreme intervals are undefined because there is an adjacent interval on only one side. 
Note that the expected number of observations in any given interval of the distribution is the average of the number in the 
two adjacent intervals.    11
capital accruals (see e.g. Burgstahler & Dichev (1997)). Since working capital consists of current assets 
and current liabilities, one could expect that firms with high levels of the specific current assets and 
liabilities accounts before the eventual earnings manipulation are likely to find it relatively easy to 
manage earnings through changes in working capital, than firms with low levels of current assets and 
liabilities accounts. In other words, it is assumed that firms that can manage earnings easily are more 
likely to manage earnings to move from small pre-managed losses to positive post-managed, or reported, 
earnings. Sorting our sample by size of specific current assets and liabilities accounts and splitting the 
sample in two – one part consisting of earnings and pre-managed earnings observations for the lowest 
inventory observations respectively the highest inventory observations, gives us the opportunity to test 
the hypothesis H1. We would now expect to observe a (significant) difference in the pattern according to 
figure 1 and table 2 when repeating the frequency distribution study from before, but now including a 
comparison of the low vs. the high inventory account observations. The expectation is that the 
observation in figure 1 comparing reported and pre-managed earnings frequency distribution will be 
much clearer for the high inventory account earnings observations than the low, since these high 
inventory accounts represent the financial statement observation where manipulative earnings 
management actions through discretional accruals management behaviour is relatively easiest to 
practice. 
 
In Panel A in Table 3 the key results concerning this hypothesis are presented. It is clearly seen that the 
hypothesis for the reported vs. the pre-managed earnings concerning the sign as well as the size for the 
standardized differences tests for the intervals immediately to the right and left of zero show different 
patterns when comparing the low vs. the high account dimension of size of the specific working capital 
accruals. For example for the inventory item, our hypothesis for the standardized differences test is 
confirmed significantly once and sign-wise twice for the highest half of the inventory levels (i.e. 3 out of 
4 possible confirmations), while our hypothesis could not be confirmed for the lowest half of the 
inventory levels. 
 
*** Insert Table 3 *** 
 
If the level of beginning-of-the-year current assets and liabilities can serve as a proxy for how easy 
earnings management can be done, it is expected that one would observe lower pre-managed levels of 
current assets and current liabilities in the intervals immediately to the left of zero reported earnings 
changes and high levels in the interval immediately to the right of zero. 
 
For testing hypothesis H2, we use the same procedure as before, but the starting point is now the 
different financial ratios expected to indicate manipulative behaviour as first documented by Beneish. In   12
Panel B in Table 3 the results of this procedure are presented. They are the results of first calculating the 
different ratios, and then divided into a low and a high half. Afterwards the frequency distribution is 
formed, and the standardized differences statistics were calculated. In general the presented results show 
the same pattern as observed in Panel A, indicating that those companies where the ratios indicate 
earnings management through discretionary accruals behaviour is easiest to practice are also where se 
can observe the management.  
 
In order to complete these earnings management considerations it is also hypothesized that the 
behaviour/pattern can be related to the operating cycle, since a large part of the working capital reflect 
how the reported earnings map into cash in the company. As a consequence, the larger the operating 
cycle, the longer the time span between the earnings and the corresponding cash. This time lag is usually 
also considered to reflect how uncertain the reported earnings numbers are, simply because of the time 
span – the larger the time span, the larger the possibility of wrong accrual estimates. Using procedure as 
before and dividing in high/low operating cycle leads to the results in Panel C in Table 3. The results 
show in general the same pattern as for the other variables, but it should be noted the standardized 
differences for the earnings here are significant also for the low part, but smaller than for the high part. 
 
*** Insert Table 4 *** 
 
To provide a more general view of the finding we present in Table 4 some key summary results. Here 
the previous results are briefly presented and comparability for the standardized differences in the two 
directions, high / low portfolio vs. reported / pre-managed earnings, is made easy. The difference 
between high and low is quite obvious in both Panel A concerning the sign as well as in Panel B 
concerning the significance. This is also confirmed by a chi-square goodness-of-fit test, 18.68, for the 
sign-setting which is significant at all relevant significance levels. In Panel B this tendency is even more 
thorough. 
 
In other words: On average, earnings are managed by those companies who have the opportunity to do 
so. In summary this tells that as earnings management in section 4.1 is evidenced to take place, it seems 
to be done where it is easiest to practice. 
 
 
5.  Summary and conclusion. 
At first, the findings in this study confirm the Dechow et al (2003), Burgstahler & Dichev (1997) and 
Hayn (1995) findings that reported earnings are managed. 
   13
The evidence in the paper supports two aspects with respect to earnings management. The first aspect is 
that firm managers engage in earnings management to avoid small losses, which was confirmed by tests 
of the reported earnings frequency distribution showing abnormal frequencies of small negative/positive 
earnings, especially compared to pre-managed earnings. These findings are interpreted as evidence that 
also Danish firm managers do engage in earnings management to avoid small losses. 
 
The second aspect however is that the average firm manager control accounting accruals with discretion 
to manage reported earnings where he can. Evidence is provided indicating that management control 
accounting accruals with discretion to manage reported earnings upward when pre-managed earnings are 
low and downward when pre-managed earnings are high. The results suggest that firms, who on the 
surface seen can manage earnings relatively easy because of high beginning accruals levels on central 
manageable accruals, are more likely to manage earnings to move from negative pre-managed earnings 
to positive reported earnings. 
 
Not surprisingly, the findings indicate that where management has the opportunity to manage the 
earnings away from a small loss, they do so for what ever reason, they might have to do so. So, 
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Discretionary accruals (DA) -0.0345 -0.0131 0.3151 -0.0550 0.0226
Pre-managed earnings (PME) 0.0723 0.0548 0.4164 0.0007 0.1178
Non-discretionary accruals (NDA) 0.0546 0.0136 0.7959 -0.0084 0.0459
Inventory 0.1845 0.1839 0.1369 0.0782 0.2751
Accounts receivable 0.1872 0.1839 0.1167 0.1220 0.2502
Other current assets 0.0320 0.0294 0.2866 0.0167 0.0466
Current liabilities 0.2577 0.2194 0.7334 0.1561 0.2852
Depreciation index (DEPI) 1.0671 0.9835 1.2014 0.8929 1.0781
Sales, general and administration index (SGAI) 1.4533 1.0816 10.7589 1.0385 1.1468
Asset quality index (AQI) 1.6270 0.9889 7.9098 0.7740 1.1666
Sales growth index (SGI) 2.6083 1.0647 35.3301 0.9836 1.1732
Days' sales in receivable index (DSRI) 1.1996 0.9964 3.0770 0.8968 1.0961
Leverage index (LVGI) 1.1329 0.9944 2.3479 0.9232 1.0714
Total accruals to total assets (TATA) 0.0256 -0.0378 4.2475 -0.0805 0.0103
Operating Cycle 524.9 135.1 1,348.6 78.5 322.2
All variables are scaled by lagged total assets














Cash flow from operations (CFO) 0.4520 1.0000
Discretionary accruals (DA) -0.2357 0.1707 1.0000
Pre-managed earnings (PME) 0.6777 0.0965 -0.8744 1.0000
Non-discretionary accruals (NDA) -0.2316 -0.9170 -0.4905 0.2555 1.0000
All variables are scaled by lagged total assets
TABLE 1
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Variables left of zero right of zero Mean Median Minimum Maximum
Reported earnings -2.3069 0.8459 0.0078 0.0000 -1.3073 1.3073
Pre-man. earnings -1.0766 0.7690 0.0012 0.0000 -1.3073 1.3457
All variables scaled by lagged total assets.
TABLE 2
Results of different standardized differences tests
Values for test intervals Values for standardized differences for remaining intervalsPanel A: Results relating to hypothesis 1
Left Right Left Right
























Panel B: Results relating to hypothesis 2
Left Right Left Right
































Leverage index LVGI Low -0.31













Panel C: Results relating to hypothesis 3
Left Right Left Right







* denotes the standardized difference is significant on a 1% level
0 denotes the standardized difference is significant on a 5% level
- denotes the standardized difference has the expected sign
All variables are scaled by lagged total assets
Reported earnings
TABLE 3
Results of standardized differences tests immediately to left and right of zero
Premanaged earnings
Premanaged earnings
Reported earnings Premanaged earnings
Reported earnings
Sales, general and 
administration index
Days' sales in receivable 
index
Total accruals to total 
assetsPanel A: Number of correct sign vs. Low/high portfolio
Low 6 / 12 1 / 12 4 / 12 1 / 12
High 12 / 12 10 / 12 10 / 12 10 / 12
Panel B: Number of significant vs. Low/high portfolio
Low 2 / 12 0 / 12 0 / 12 0 / 12
High 10 / 12 6 / 12 2 / 12 1 / 12
TABLE 4
Summary results of the standardized differences tests 
vs. Low/high portfolio and vs. Reported/pre-managed 
earnings
Number of significant results for the previous test vs. Total 
number of tests
Reported earnings Premanaged earnings
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